You would like to have a standard API for getting cryptographic randomness or entropy, which you can then bind to any underlying implementation. Many recipes in this book rely on random numbers and use the API in this recipe without concern for what implementation is behind it.
The API in this recipe is exactly what you need. In this recipe, we show the API and how to use it. In the next few recipes, we discuss how to bind it to third-party randomness infrastructures.
At an API level, this recipe is only going to look at how to fill a buffer with random bytes. To get random values for other data types, see Recipe 11.10 through Recipe 11.14.
Here we are going to build a random number generation API where there is only a single generator per application, or perhaps even a single generator for the entire machine. Either way, we expect that the application will have to initialize the API. Note that the initialization may need to seed a cryptographic pseudo-random number generator, so the initialization part might hang. If that is a problem, launch a thread to call the initialization routine, but be aware that asking for any cryptographically strong pseudo-random numbers at all will cause your program to abort if the system has not been initialized. The initialization routine is simply:
Because we know well that people will often forget to perform initialization, implementations of this API should automatically check to see if this routine has been called when using other API calls, and call it at that point if not.
After initialization, we will provide two universally available options for reading data, as well as a third option that will not always be available:
Get cryptographically strong random numbers, as generated from a well-seeded pseudo-random number generator.
Get entropy if it is available, and if it is not, fall back on cryptographically strong random numbers (using any available entropy).
Get data that should be highly entropic that has never passed through a pseudo-random number generator. Note that this function is not always available and that it will hang until enough entropy is available.
The first function, which always produces cryptographically strong randomness, has the following signature:
unsigned char *spc_rand(unsigned char *buf, size_t b);
It places b bytes into memory, starting at the location buf, and returns buf (this is done to minimize the chance of someone misusing the API). This function always returns unless it causes your program to abort, which it does only if spc_rand_init( ) has never successfully returned.
The second function, which returns entropy if it is available, and otherwise produces cryptographically strong randomness, has the following signature:
unsigned char *spc_keygen(unsigned char *buf, size_t b);
The arguments are the same as for spc_rand( ). The name change reflects the fact that this is meant to be the function you will generally use for generating long-term key material, unless you want to insist that key material come directly from entropy, in which case you should use the spc_entropy( ) function. For all other uses, we recommend using spc_rand( ).
The spc_entropy( ) function mimics the first two functions:
unsigned char *spc_entropy(unsigned char *buf, size_t b);
However, note that this function will block until it has enough entropy collected to fill the buffer. For Windows, this function is only usable using the code in this book if you use EGADS, as discussed in Recipe 11.8.
Recipe 11.8, Recipe 11.10, Recipe 11.11, Recipe 11.12, Recipe 11.13, Recipe 11.14, Recipe 11.16