You want to record activity and/or errors in your program for later review.
On Unix systems, syslog is the system audit logging facility. Windows also has its own built-in facility for audit logging that differs significantly from syslog on Unix.
We cannot overstate the importance of audit logging for security and, more importantly, for forensics. Unfortunately, most existing logging infrastructures severely lack any kind of security. It is generally trivial for attackers to cover their tracks by modifying or deleting any logs that would betray their presence or indicate how they managed to infiltrate your system. A number of things can be done to raise the bar, making it much more difficult for the would-be attacker to invalidate your logs. (We acknowledge, however, that no solution is perfect.)
One such possibility involves logging to a network server that is dedicated to storing the logs of other machines on the network. The Unix syslog utility provides a simple interface for configuring logging to a network server instead of writing the log files on the local system, but the system administrator must do the configuration. Configuration cannot be done programmatically by individual programs using the service to make log entries.
If the server that is responsible for audit logging is configured properly, it can make an attacker's job of scrubbing your logs considerably more difficult, but it doesn't provide any real guarantees that your log files will not be altered or deleted by an attacker. Your audit log server should be configured to accept remote logging connections and nothing else. Any other access to the log files should require physical access to the machine. This makes it significantly more difficult for an attacker to gain access to your logs. If you need remote access to view your log files, a service like ssh is reasonably safe to enable as long as it is properly configured, but it does increase the risk of the log files being compromised.
 In particular, protocol 1, root logins, and password authentication should be disabled. Any user accounts on the machine should not share their names with any other names on your network, making it more difficult for an attacker to guess an account name and password if he has compromised the rest of your network and has access to your password files. In general, your logging machine should share as little in common as possible with all other systems on your network.
One final point regarding logging to a remote server using syslog: syslog sends log entries to the server over a UDP port without any kind of encryption or authentication. As a side effect of using a connectionless protocol, syslog is also notorious for losing log entries, particularly on heavily loaded systems.
Ideally, syslog would support making entries using an SSL-enabled TCP connection with authentication, but because it does not, system administrators should take steps to protect the log entries in transit to the logging server. One possible way to do this is to use a virtual private network (VPN) between the logging server and all network hosts that will be using it. Other possibilities include signing and encrypting the log entries in your programs before sending the entries to syslog, but this can be very difficult to do correctly. In an ideal world, the syslog daemon would handle encryption and signatures for you.
An alternative to using the stock syslog implementation that is included as part of most Unix distributions is to use syslog-ng, produced by Balabit IT Security LTD in Budapest, available under the GPL from http://www.balabit.com/products/syslog_ng/. It provides support for a variety of different network protocols, including both UDP and TCP; however, it does not support any kind of encryption or authentication. Before making the decision to use syslog-ng, you should be aware that it has had a few security vulnerabilities in recent history.
The audit logging service that is a part of Windows makes no provision for network logging. Every system stores its logs locally. In addition, log files are stored in a proprietary binary format that is not documented. At least in theory, it is possible to make the Windows logging service relay log entries to a centralized server, but to do so would require a program external to the logging service that listens for logging notifications and forwards them to the logging server. Logging to a remote server in this manner would cause a record to be kept in two locations: one on the local machine, and the other on the remote server.
Unfortunately, this solution is not likely to work very well in practice, because the Windows logging service depends upon local DLLs to supply the messages that you see when you view the logs. When a program wants to make log entries using the Windows logging service, it must first register a DLL that contains logging information with the logging service. When log entries are made, only a small amount of information is stored; this information includes a timestamp, an integer value representing the log message, and possibly some additional "metadata" that makes up the variable portion of the log message. The full textual message is never stored; instead, the DLLs that have been registered with the logging service provide the message on demand when the logs are viewed.
On the surface, the idea of logging to read-only media sounds like a good idea, but in practice, it does not usually work out very well. There are a surprising number of serious problems with logging to CD-R. In fact, we recommend against it; we feel that the problems greatly outweigh the benefits.
One of the primary problems with logging to CD-R is the lack of hardware and software support for doing so. In order to write log entries out to CD-R in real time, writing must be done in what is known as packet-writing mode. Packet-writing mode allows data to be written to the CD-R incrementally instead of all at once. Most available hardware does not support packet-writing mode for CD-R. As a direct consequence of this, most operating systems do not have support for it either.
Perhaps the most obvious problem with logging to CD-R is that it requires constant monitoring and manual intervention. CD-R media is small, holding only roughly 660MB. A busy system could fill this up quite quickly, so someone must keep a close eye on the logging system, being prepared to swap media when necessary. In most environments, having someone around to swap CDs is not an effective use of resources. More importantly, if a busy system can fill up the media quickly under normal conditions, imagine what an attacker could do!
Other problems with packet-writing mode are performance and reliability. Because operating in packet-writing mode is slow, a busy system is very likely going to fall well behind the activity that is going on in real time. Reliability is also an issue. If an error of some kind occurs, there is a high probability that any data written to the CD-R will be lost. In addition, if an attacker were to reboot the system before the CD-R was finalized, all of the data on that CD-R would be lost.
If you still want to log to CD-R in "real time," be sure that you don't rely solely on CD-R copies. You should also keep local copies on the system's hard drive and log to a network server if you can.
Signing and encrypting entries made to log files can help ensure the integrity of the logs that are generated. Ideally, the logging server would be responsible for performing the cryptographic operations on all entries submitted to it, but neither syslog nor the Windows logging service provide built-in support for either signing or encrypting log entries. It is possible, however, to sign and/or encrypt the entries before submitting them to the logging server.
On Unix systems that use syslog, there is no guarantee that entries will be written to log files in the order in which they are submitted by a program. This is a side effect of using datagram sockets for communication between clients and the server. With this in mind, make sure that you include all of the information required to decrypt or verify the signature on a log entry in a single entry. Note also that other clients could possibly make log entries in between multiple entries being made from your program, which is something that can also happen with the Windows logging service.
Signing and encrypting log entries will prevent an attacker from modifying the log entries undetected, but it will not prevent an attacker from deleting the log entries or replacing them with garbage or captured log entries. There is no way to really prevent an attacker from deleting the contents of a log file or making the contents unreadable. The best you can do is to set things up in such a way that you can determine when log files have been manipulated, but signing and encrypting alone will not do this for you.
To be able to determine whether log entries have been deleted or modified in some way, you can employ a MAC with a sequential nonce. For each log entry that is made, increment the nonce by one. The log entries can then be checked to ensure that all nonces are accounted for and that no duplicates have been inserted into the log file.
syslog-ng by Balabit IT Security LTD: http://www.balabit.com/products/syslog_ng/