# 5.3 Selecting an Appropriate Key Length

#### 5.3.1 Problem

You are using a cipher with a variable key length and need to decide which key length to use.

#### 5.3.2 Solution

Strike a balance between long-term security needs and speed requirements. The weakest commonly used key length we would recommend in practice would be Triple-DES keys (112 effective bits). For almost all other algorithms worth considering, it is easy to use 128-bit keys, and you should do so. Some would even recommend using a key size that's twice as big as the effective strength you'd like (but this is unnecessary if you properly use a nonce when you encrypt; see Section 5.3.3).

#### 5.3.3 Discussion

Some ciphers offer configurable key lengths. For example, AES allows 128-bit, 192-bit, or 256-bit keys, whereas RC4 allows for many different sizes, but 40 bits and 128 bits are the common configurations. The ease with which an attacker can perform a brute-force attack (trying out every possible key) is based not only on key length, but also on the financial resources of the attacker. 56-bit keys are trivial for a well-funded government to break, and even a person with access to a reasonable array of modern desktop hardware can break 56-bit keys fairly quickly. Therefore, the lifetime of 56-bit keys is unreasonable for any security needs. Unfortunately, there are still many locations where 40-bit keys or 56-bit keys are used, because weak encryption used to be the maximum level of encryption that could be exported from the United States.

 Symmetric key length recommendations do not apply to public key lengths. See Recipe 7.3 for public key length recommendations.

Supporting cryptographically weak configurations is a risky proposition. Not only are the people who are legitimately using those configurations at risk, but unless you are extremely careful in your protocol design, it is also possible that an attacker can force the negotiation of an insecure configuration by acting as a "man in the middle" during the initial phases of a connection, before full-fledged encryption begins. Such an attack is often known as a rollback attack, because the attacker forces the communicating parties to use a known insecure version of the protocol. (We discuss how to thwart such attacks in Recipe 10.7.)

In the real world, people try very hard to get to 80 bits of effective security, which we feel is the minimum effective strength you should accept. Generally, 128 bits of effective security is considered probably enough for all time, if the best attack that can be launched against a system is brute force. However, even if using the right encryption mode, that still assumes no cryptographic weaknesses in the cipher whatsoever.

In addition, depending on the way you use encryption, there are precomputation and collision attacks that allow the attacker to do better than brute force. The general rule of thumb is that the effective strength of a block cipher is actually half the key size, assuming the cipher has no known attacks that are better than brute force.

However, if you use random data properly, you generally get a bit of security back for each bit of the data (assuming it's truly random; see Recipe 11.1 for more discussion about this). The trick is using such data properly. In CBC mode, generally the initialization vector for each message sent should be random, and it will thwart these attacks. In most other modes, the initialization vector acts more like a nonce, where it must be different for each message but doesn't have to be completely random. In such cases, you can select a random value at key setup time, then construct per-message initializers by combining the random value and a message counter.

In any event, with a 128-bit key, we strongly recommend that you build a system without a 64-bit random value being used in some fashion to prevent against attack.

Should you use key lengths greater than 128 bits, especially considering that so many algorithms provide for them? For example, AES allows for 128-bit, 192-bit, and 256-bit keys. Longer key lengths provide more security, yet for AES they are less efficient (in most other variable key length ciphers, setup gets more expensive, but encryption does not). In several of our own benchmarks, 128-bit AES is generally only about 33% faster than 256-bit AES. Also, 256-bit AES runs at least 50% faster than Triple-DES does. When it was the de facto standard, Triple-DES was considered adequate for almost all applications.

In the real world, 128 bits of security may be enough for all time, even considering that the ciphers we use today are probably nowhere near as good as they could be. And if it ever becomes something to worry about, it will be news on geek web sites like Slashdot. Basically, when the U.S. government went through the AES standardization process, they were thinking ahead in asking for algorithms capable of supporting 192-bit and 256-bit keys, just in case future advances like quantum computing somehow reduce the effective key strength of symmetric algorithms.

Until there's a need for bigger keys, we recommend sticking with 128-bit keys when using AES as there is no reason to take the efficiency hit when using AES. We say this particularly because we don't see anything on the horizon that is even a remote threat.

However, this advice assumes you're really getting 128 bits of effective strength. If you refuse to use random data to prevent against collision and precomputation attacks, it definitely makes sense to move to larger key sizes to obtain your desired security margin.

Recipe 5.3, Recipe 7.3, Recipe 10.7, Recipe 11.1

 Foreword
 Preface
 Chapter 1. Safe Initialization
 Chapter 2. Access Control
 Chapter 3. Input Validation
 Chapter 4. Symmetric Cryptography Fundamentals
 Chapter 6. Hashes and Message Authentication
 Chapter 7. Public Key Cryptography
 Chapter 8. Authentication and Key Exchange
 Chapter 9. Networking
 Chapter 10. Public Key Infrastructure
 Chapter 11. Random Numbers
 Chapter 12. Anti-Tampering
 Chapter 13. Other Topics
 Colophon